We study a Wireless Physical Layer Network Coding (WPLNC) technique in decentralised and distributed relay network where a maliciously behaving relay may be present. Most research works optimistically assume altruistic cooperation of the relays. The malicious node can make a significant disorder among the other relays by selecting its own WPLNC mapping. We describe this scenario as a static (single shot) incomplete information game where a node type -either friendly or malicious -of relay is its private information. We focus on existence of particular equilibria given the probability of malicious node presence.
System model: A network of interest consists of two independent sources S 1 , S 2 , two relays R R , R C , where subscript R stands for row and C for column to denote the players of the game, and a destinations D, see Fig.1 . This is a multi-relay and wireless extension of a butterfly network [1] . It is also the simplest network that can illustrate the studied issues.
We assume the relay R C is always friendly -its aim is to support S to D communication and it is rewarded for this task. However the relay R R can be, with some probability, malicious. In this case its aim is to cause harm by using such a processing that prevents D from recovery of the source data. It is rewarded too, but for the harm caused. The relay R C does not know the type of the R R while R R itself knows it.
Since WPLNC is assumed, each relay observes a superposition of incoming signals from both sources. Those observations may differ due to channel parametrisation. Instead of distinguishing both individual sources the relay works with the overlapped signal as a whole. Relay processing -a decode and forward type -is generally given by a mapping
where i ∈ {R, C} denotes the relay, c 1 , c 2 and c i are symbols transmitted by S 1 , S 2 and R i respectively. Notice that for simplicity we assume mapping over individual symbols not over whole codewords, which is also possible. The mapping is allowed to be many-to-one. In fact to utilise the gain of WPLNC it must be the many-to-one mapping.
According to [5] we divide the WPLNC mappings f i into several categories based on input and output cardinality relation. Assume a given source symbol cardinality |c 1 | = |c 2 | = |c| then a mapping with cardinality |c i | = |c| will be denoted as a minimal one; XOR mapping is the well known example of the minimal mapping. A mapping with |c i | = |c||c| is denoted as a full one and every mapping in between those two bounds is denoted as an extended mapping.
According to the assumptions every destination node observes c R and c C symbols separately from the relays and wants to recover the original source symbols c 1 , c 2 from them. This is possible if and only if it is allowed by the properties of both relay mappings f R and f C i.e. if and only if an inverse mapping exist at the destination D j :
(2)
Notice that existence of inverse mapping depends on both mappings f R and f C so this is the place where malicious relay may attack the network. If this inverse mapping exists for f R , f C we call the pair of them an invertible pair, otherwise it is a non-invertible pair.
In a centralised network the relay mappings f i can be tailored to fit the situation properly, but this is not the case in distributed control scenarios. When the relays perform selfish selection of f i , with lack of knowledge of the other relay actions, the invertibility of the source data may be violated since the inverse mapping in Eq. (2) may not exist. The situation is even more complicated when the relay does not perfectly know the type of the opponent -whether it is friendly or malicious.
Incomplete information game:
To analyse the problem of distributed selection of WPLNC mapping by the relays we describe the situation as an incomplete information non-cooperative game G of two players R R , R C [9] . The game is the incomplete information game since the relays do not know the behaviour (friendly/malicious) of the other relay. Thus they do not know all the information relevant for their decision, a part of the information is private, revealed only to one of the nodes.
The game of interest is defined as follows. The set of players consists of R R and R C . The set of actions of each player consists of several various WPLNC mappings f i . Although the players' action sets can be much wider, the minimal action subset is as follows: two different minimal mappings MIN 1,2 , two different extended ones EXT 1,2 and one full mapping. This set is capable of describing all the situations that can occur in specific instances of the game -such as two minimal mappings that form an invertible pair (i.e. f −1 j exists), a non-invertible pair of the minimal and the extended mapping (i.e. f −1 j does not exist), etc. For the sake of simplicity this action set is common to both players. We also assume that channel conditions allow the relays to use any mapping from their action set. For some channel conditions the performance (minimal distance, BER, etc.) of various mappings may differ, discussion about the parametric channel performance of WPLNC can be found in [10] .
The set of players' types is t R ∈ {F, M} and t C ∈ {F}, where F stands for Friendly and M for Malicious. The type of R R in particular realisation of the game G is given by chance -friendly version is chosen with Pr{t R = F} = p and malicious with Pr{t R = M} = 1 − p. For the sake of simplicity we assume that only R R has two possible incarnations. R C is always friendly, i.e. Pr{t C = F} = 1.
The players have beliefs about the opponent types, such as p R (t C |t R ). In the analysed game it is assumed that player's belief is independent of the player's own type, e.g. p R (F|F) = p R (F|M) = 1. Finally there is a payoff function π i of each player that assigns a reward to the player i. In contrast to complete information game the payoff function of the player i depends not only on the actions played by all the players but also on their types, i.e. π i (a R , a C ; t R , t C ) where a R , a C are actions of R R , R C and t R , t C are their appropriate types.
For friendly players a payoff is determined by the cardinality of the mapping (MIN, EXT, FULL) and their invertibility. The friendly relay (R C always, R R if its type t R is F) is rewarded by A for using minimal, B for the extended and C for the full mapping. However when the friendly relays select a non-invertible pair of mappings, that do not allow the destinations to recover the source data, both relays have to pay a nonpositive penalty P as a punishment. The payoff preference is A > B > P, A W, P P, B W, P P, C EXT2 W, P P, A W, P P, B P, C FULL P, A P, A P, B P, B P, C C > 0 ≥ P , thus the relay always tries to minimise its output cardinality while the invertibility of WPLNC at the destination is guaranteed. The malicious relay (R C never, R R if its type t R is M) is rewarded for the caused disorder. It obtains a payoff W whenever it selects a WPLNC mapping that forms a non-invertible pair with the friendly relay. Under this condition the destination is unable to decode the source data and thus the friendly relay is transmitting and spending its resources in vain. When the malicious relay selects a mapping that forms invertible pair with the friendly node it has failed in its task, it is in fact supporting the friendly relay and thus spends in vain its resources and it is penalised by P . The payoff preference of the malicious relays is W > 0 ≥ P .
A strategy is a function that for every player type assigns an action from the set of actions. The strategy for player R R , with two possible types, is a doublet MIN 2 ) means that R R uses MIN 1 when it is the friendly relay while MIN 2 when it is malicious. There is only one type of R C so its strategy coincides with its action, e.g. s C = EXT 2 . We will use notation s i (t i ) to denote particular action used by player i of type t i .
There are two types of the player R R thus we can construct two payoff matrices of two game incarnations. The first one, when both relays are friendly, is shown in Tab.1. The second one, when the R R is malicious is in Tab.2. In both matrices the column is determined by the action played by R C and the row by the action of R R . The entries of the matrices have a form π R (a R , a C ; t R , t C ), π C (a R , a C ; t R , t C ), the first number is a reward of R R of type t R when a pair of actions a R , a C is played. The second number gives a reward of R C of type t C . Notice that these two games are complete information games, it is the chance who selects which one of these games will be played by selecting the players' types.
Nash Equilibria Analysis and Discussion:
In incomplete information games the solution concept of Nash equilibria is extended to so called Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) [9] . A strategy profile s * = (s * R , s * C ) is a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for each player i and each of its type t i holds
where subscript −i denotes the player other than i. BNE strategy maximises the expected payoff of the player given the player's type and belief. Similarly to the Nash equilibria (NE) in complete information games the BNE represents the point where no player has any incentive to alter its strategy. In contrast to NE the BNE depends not only on the strategies but also on players' types and their beliefs. It can be easily shown that friendly vs. friendly incarnation of the game has multiple (two) pure strategy NE, highlighted by bold font in Tab.1. Both equilibria use MIN WPLNC mappings and give optimal (in Pareto sense) outcomes to both players. In contrast, it can be shown that malicious vs. friendly game incarnation has no pure strategy equilibria. Notice that for both versions of game some mixed strategies also exist.
Since friendly version of the game has optimal NE from network point of view -sources are successfully recovered at the destination while the relays' utilities are maximised -we focus on the strategies containing some MIN WPLNC mapping and test when they are BNEs. Proof: Proof that is based on search for mutual best responses to the relay strategies is omitted due to space limitations. Conditions where the studied strategies are BNE are shown in a from of regions in Fig.2 . Conclusion: Particular WPLNC mapping pars were analysed in scenario with potential presence of evil nodes. Conditions, under which there are game equilibria, are evaluated. These conditions are important for design of valuations of the nodes' utility functions. We show that meaningful utility design resulting to existence of particular Bayesian Nash equilibria is possible. Such a network can provide good performance even in the presence of the malicious nodes.
Notice the game is assumed to be a single-shot only. The relays has no chance to update their beliefs about the opponent type based on observed actions and thus develop resistance to the bad nodes. Such a gamedynamic Bayesian -is a topic for future research.
